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Abstract 
Ac<?or~ing. to Horn and Wolinsky' s model on the patterns of 
unionization the workers• and the firm's interests with respect 
to the scope of unio~ization are always opposed to each other. 
Of _cour~e, t;ransaction costs of bargaining can establish a 
region in. which _an encompassing union is more profitable for 
both par~ie~. This note demonstrates that due to externalities 
of ne~otiations the range of this possibility is much lager than 
the difference of expected transaction costs. 
r. Introduction 
Wage bargaining under unionization is observed to be performed 
under a variety of patterns of unionization. Economic 
explanations of the scope of the union have primarily been 
dealing with legal-institutional constraints on the one hand, 
and with strategic reasons on the other hand. An important 
contribution putting down the pattern of unionization to 
technological characteristics of production has been presented 
by Horn and Wolinsky (1988). They show that if workers are close 
substitutes in production, then the equilibrium form of 
unionization is an encompassing union, whereas if workers are 
complements, two separate unions will emerge. The intuition 
behind this result is that a union representing all workers 
within a firm negotiates for the whole product of labor, whereas 
a union representing only a part of workers negotiates for the 
group's marginal product. If workers are substitutes in 
production, the average product exceeds the marginal product of 
labor and workers do better by joining a single union. If, 
however, the marginal product exceeds the average product of 
labor, two separate unions can push through higher wages for 
workers. 
According to Horn and Wolinsky's view the interests of workers 
and employers with respect to the structure of unionization are 
if an encompassing union is 
be pref erred 
always opposed to each other: 
favorable for one party, separate unionization will 
. . 
by the other one. 
Obviously it is easy to imagine that transaction costs of 
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negotiations could affect this result. As costs of negotiations 
neither are to be treated as being part of the "pie" to be 
shared nor as part of the disagreement piont, but simply as 
lump-sum expenditures involved in the process of negotiations, 
each party has to bea~ them by itself if it decides to enter 
negotiations at all. Now, if an encompassing union is formed, 
negotiations take place only _once (and not twice as with two 
separate unions). Consequently, both workers and the firm can 
economize on bargaining costs. They will agree on the optimal 
structure of unionization when transaction costs are substantial 
and when the difference between the marginal product and the 
average product of labor is not too pronounced. 
This paper shows that the region in which firms and workers will 
agree on the scope of unionization might be much larger than 
expected by simply comparing the agents' costs of negotiations 
in the two regimes of unionization. Accordingly, if costs of 
bargaining are substantial, we should often expect to observe 
the formation of an encompassing union even i_f workers are 
complements in production. 
Bargaing costs can be thought of as consisting of two main 
components: First, direct costs of bargaining cover opportunity 
costs of time foregone py negotiating as well as direct costs of 
bargaining inclusive the disutility - of the process of 
negotiations itself. If bargaining happens to take place within 
a short period, the second component of costs will be more 
important. It refers to the costs of gathering information about 
the pie and other party's possibilities if no settlement- can be 
found. Hicks has explicitly stressed the importance of costs of 
negotiations in his "Theory of Wages" (Hicks 19 66, p .144 ff.) by 
pointing out that parties first have to become informed about 
the other party's possibilities of making concessions. 
Costs of 9etting information prior to meeting at the negotiation 
table are explicitly to be distinguished from learning the 
relevant information during the process of bargaining. This 
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latter aspect has extensively been analyzed by the literature on 
signalling, which is arguing that an agent can identify himself 
as a "stong" party by proposing offers and counteroffers which 
he could not afford to make if he were in a weak position. 
(Fudenberg and Tirle 1983, Sobel and Takahashi 1983). 
The paper proceeds 
formation with an 
separate unions are 
made in section IV. 
as follows: Section II considers wage 
encompassing union, in section III two 
assumed to exist. Finally, a comparision is 
II. Encompassing union wage bargaining 
In what follows the most simple version of Horn and Wolinsky's 
(1988) model of the bargaining process is used. Neglecting the 
parties' costs of negotiations, they assume that output is x if 
one worker is employed and x+y if two homogeneous workers 
produce at the same time. The disagreement point of both the 
workers and the firm in case of no production is set equal to 
zero for simplicity. If workers join together in an encompassing 
union to bargain for wages, they will get half of the surplus, 
i.e. 2w=(x+y)/2. This result is derived as a perfect equilibrium 
in Rubinstein's (1982) noncooperative bargaining model of 
alternating offers and counteroffers if wage bargaining is 
supposed to take place within a short period of.time, so that 
the parties' discount factor o (6<1) approaches one. Thus if 
workers agree on sharing the wage sum negotiated equally, each 
one gets w = 1/4(x+y). 
We assume that each time bargaining takes place, the firm and 
the union have to make lump-sum expenses cF and cl, respectively. 
In general, the bargaining costs of both parties will depend on 
the size of the union. However, for simplicity we assume cF and 
cl to be given exegeneously independently of the structure of 
unionization, reflecting the basic insight that the technology 
of bargaining will exhibit increasing economies of scale. The 
main reason for decreasing agerage costs of bargaining per 
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worker is due to typical free-rider problems: even if the 
relevant information has already been acquired by one of the 
separate unions or by the firm, this party would have no 
incentive to tell it truthfully to the party still uninformed. 
Rathermore, it would bias information available in order to 
increase its own share of the pie. 
As cF and cl are sunk costs arising independently of the outcome 
of bargaining, they can neither be treated to be part of the pie 
nor to be part of the d~sagreement point. Therefore, each party 
has to bear it by itself. With an encompassing union wages net 
of transaction costs are given by 
because cl is shared by workers. Net profits are found to be 
7fe = l/2{X + y} -· cF 
as the firm has to bargaing only once. 
III. Separate union wage bargaining 
If workers bargaing fC?r wages separately, the firm has the 
authority to stop cooperation with one of them if no agreement 
can be found and to continue producuction with the other one 
(See Sutton 1986, p.715). Therefore, the firm's disagreement 
point is shifted upwards. If again the time period for 
negotiations is assumed to be small, 6• 1 so that the discount 
factor can be neglected. In this case worker A's wage is 
approximately given by wA = l/2{x+y-w8-(x-x/2)}, where (x+y-W8 ) 
is the firm's profit if both A and Bare at work. (x-x/2) refers 
to the firm's disagreement point as it can credibly threaten to 
fire worker A and carry on working with Bat w8 = x/2, B's share 
of the product that he can bargain for if h_e is the only one to 
be employed. Workers being identical, each one of them faces the 
risk of being fired when entering into negotiations with his 
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employer. As a consequence, wA = w8 must hold in equilibrium. 
Taking account of transaction costs of negotiations, wages with 
separate unions are given by 
W5 = (X + 2y)/6 - CL. 
The firm having to bargaing twice in this case, net profit is 
7T 5 = (2x + y)/3 2cF. 
IV. Comparision 
If transaction costs are negligible, Horn and Wolinsky's main 
result can be derived straightforward, according to which 
workers will join an encompassing union if they are substitutes 
in production, i.e. y<x holds. For y>x, two separate unions will 
be formed. The firm's interest is exactly opposed to that of 
workers: If y<x profits are higher if workers are organized in 
separate unions. For y>x the employer always prefers bargaining 
with an encompassing union. 
Taking transaction costs into consideration, workers will form 
an encompassing union if we>w5 or if 
(1) y < X + 6cL. 
The firm, on the other hand, would be better off facing an 
encompassing union if 1Te>1r5 , implying 
( 2) Y > X - 6CF. 
Although the difference in transaction costs only amounts to cL/2 
for each individual worker and to cF for the firm, the weight of 
transaction costs in conditions (1) and (2) is given by the 
factor 6 and is therefore much more pronounced. Multiplication 
of bargaining costs arises as the difference of wages in the two 
regimes of unionization are only a small part of the whole 
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product of labor, whereas bargaining costs are a lump-sum 
expenditure to be made at each negotiation separately. In other 
words, the workers' marginal contribution of bargaining by 
forming separate unions is only a small percentage of the wage 
received with an encompassing union (if y>x is satisfied), yet 
marginal costs of bargaining separately are given by cL/2. A 
similar reasonning holds for the profits of the firm. The shaded 
area of fig.1 shows the ·region where both parties prefer to have 
an encompassing union for the whole workforce of the firm. 
Fig.1: 
y 
/ 
X 
0 
One might argue, that the region for y: x<y<x-6cF is of no 
relevance in this co~text since it is workers and not the firm 
who decide on the structure of unionization. Nevertheless, the 
existence of this region could affect the firm's incentive to 
make strategic moves in order to prevent workers from joining 
together in an encompassiong union. However, this possibility 
has not been dealt with in this paper. 
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